Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Discussion Papers

Economic Growth Center

4-1-1980

Marriage and Labor Market Discrimination in Japan
Kathryn Anderson
M. Anne Hill

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series

Recommended Citation
Anderson, Kathryn and Hill, M. Anne, "Marriage and Labor Market Discrimination in Japan" (1980).
Discussion Papers. 356.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/356

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information,
please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

C

ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 1987, Yale Station
New Haven, Connecticut

CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 348

MARRIAGE AND LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINATION IN JAPAN

Kathryn H. Anderson and M. Anne Hill
April 1980

Notes:

Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated
to stimulate discussion and critical comment. References in
publications to Discussion Papers should be cleared with the
author to protect the tentative character of these papers.
This research was supported by postdoctoral fellowships from
the National Institute of Health. Additional funding was
provided by the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation grant
to the Yale Economic Demography Program. Comments from
members of the Labor and Population Workshop were greatly
appreciated. All errors are the authors' own.

MARRIAGE AND LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINATION IN JAP&"l

by Kathryn H. Anderson and M. Anne Hill

One determinant of lower population growth is a decrease in the
total fertility rate.

Fertility can be changed not only by reducing

marital fertility at every age but also by changing the pattern of
nuptiality.

Lesthaegne (1971) fit the "standard" nuptiality curve

developed by Coale (1971) to Middle Eastern data and found that nup
tiality changes produce the same effect on population growth as changes
in marital fertility.

He found, for example, that if the minimum age

of marriage in Turkey is raised from 13,5 to 16 years, perhaps as the
result of a government decree, fertility declines of 15 percent are
expected.

Similar results are derived from a simulation study by

Menken and Bongaarts (1979) in which the total fertility rate declines
from 9.31 to 7.85 if the age at marriage rises from 20 years to 20.3
years.
To determine under what conditions a change in the age at mar
riage can be expected, demographer s and economists have analyzed house
hold behavior.

Demographic literature examines socioeconom ic differ

entials in fertility without actually modelling behavior.

Bumpass

(1969), Hogan (1978), Dixon (1971), and others find significant dif
ferences in age at marriage by religion, area of residence (urban/
rural), educational level, wealth, occupation, and family type.
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Economic work on marriage by Keeley and Becker views marriage
within the framework of choice.

Keeley (1977, 1979) models the pro

cess of searching for a mate, emphasizing the costs of search.

A

single person must decide whether to enter the marriage market and,
upon entering, how long to search.

An optimal sequential search pro

cess is pursued if he enters the marriage market.

The costs of search

depend on the value of time and the prices of goods purchased during
the search.

From the model, women are expected to marry later if the

female wage increases relative to the male wage, causing the net gain
to marriage to fall.

F.Jnpirical results support most of the model's

predictions.
In Becker's (1973, 1974) theory of marriage, marriage occurs if
the benefits from marriage exceed the costs.

In other words, the indi

vidual's share of marital income must exceed the maximum output pro
ducible in a single household for marriage to occur.

Gains to marriage

depend on wage and non-wage income when married and single, the prices
of purchased inputs used in the production of household commodities, and
the efficiency of household production.

If the husband aa~d wife's time

in home production are complementary or there are economies of scale in
production in the married household, the gain to marriage increases
relative to the cost.

Becker does not empirically test his model,

but Friedan (1974) does find some support for the importance of economic
variables in determining the proportion of females married.

If the dif

ference in the male and female wage rates is large (indicating some com
plementarity between male and female household time), the proportion of
women marrying increases.

An

increase in wealth or technological change

in the home results in an increase in marriage.
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The major problem with t~e economic household models of marriage
is that no unambiguous predictions are readily derivable without placing
some structure on the form of the home production functions.

In addition,

as Wallace (1974) points out, the models are deterministic, and implications
concerning the "likelihood" of ever-marrying require a stochastic frame

work.

The empirical estimation of marriage equations also requires

improvement.

In particular, separate measures of full labor and non-

labor wealth are needed to adequately estimate the wealth and wage
effects.
Our paper on marriage begins with the development of an economic
model of the decision to marry based on Becker's model and placing some
structure on the form of the production functions.

In the second sec

tion, we present a stochastic model of the age at marriage derived from
our marriage model.

In the third section, by applying rationing theory,

we demonstrate how outlawing a Japanese practice requiring married women
to withdraw from the paid labor force affects the optimal age at marriage.
Finally, our mo<lel of the age at marriage is tested in the last section
using data from Japan.

1.

THE DECISION TO MARRY

Our model of the decision to marry is derived from Becker (1973)
and Wallace (1974).

At some point in an individual's life, he makes the

decision to marry or to remain single.

In order to make this decision,

he compares the maximum lifetime utility attainable in marriage with the
maximum lifetime utility attainable in the single state and chooses to
marry only if the utility expected in marriage is larger.
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We are interested in the individual's decision to marry rather than
the joint decision of two potential

spouses, and we are abstracting from

search for a mate. The individual begins with knowledge of his utility func
tion as a single person, the characteristics of the potential spouse, and
the objective function of the married household.

Given this information,

each individual can ascertain the optimal utility that he can achieve in the
married household as well as the single household.

The utility function is

separable and composed of two cormnodities--N and Z--which are produced in
the home.

The commodity Z may be viewed as a group of commodities,

the production of which is less costly in the single household.

For

example, Z may be privacy--its cost increases where a spouse contributes time to its production.

N m~y be, for example, child services

which are produced at lower cost in the married household.

The dif

ference between the two utility functions depends on differences in the
production functions for Zand N and the budget constraints in each
state.
In the single woman's household, Zand N are produced with inputs
of her time and market goods.

In the married household, Z. and N are

produced with her time, her husband's time, and market goods.

If the

production functions are linear homogeneous, then the shadow prices of
Zand N are easily derived as weighted linear function~ of the input
prices--the value of the wife's time (WW), the value of the husband's
time (WH), and the prices of goods used in production (PXZ and P~).
The single woman's full income is the sum of her unearned income
(VW) and her full time (T) evaluated at her market wage (WWT).

Full

income is spent on purchases of goods and time used in the production
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of z and N.

In the married househo ld, full income is augmente d by her

husband 's unearned income (VH) and his full time evaluate d at his mar
ket wage (WHT).

VW and VH include intergen erationa l transfer s of wealth

and human capital includin g inherita nces.
To determin e whether or not marriage is optimal , the single woma:n
compare s the optimal utility within marriag e to the optimal utility in
the single househo ld.

Utility in each state is maximize d subject to

the full income and producti on constra ints.

The optimal quantit ies of

Zand N are derived as function s of wages, prices, and income.

Optimal

Zand N are then substitu ted back into the utility function s and the

*
*
indirec t utilitie s within marriage and the single state (UM and US) are
obtained .

* marriag e is optimal.
* is greater than US,
If UM

* remainin g single is optimal .
greater than UM'
The indirec t utilitie s are derived in Appendix A.

From the model,

the followin g implicat ions are obtained . First, the higher the husband 's
nonearn ings income, the higher the gain to marriag e.

Second, higher

non-earn ings income for the wite implies a lower gain to marriage if
the weighted share of her wealth in a single househo ld exceeds the
weighted share of her wealth in a married househo ld.

Third, if the

income elastic ities of demand for N and Z exceed the elastic ity of
substitu tion between N and Z, then an increase in the wife's wage
will

likely

result in a decrease in the gain from marriag e.

Finally , if the husband 's time share in the producti on of Z is larger
than his time share in the producti on

of Nin the married househo ld,

then an increase in the husband 's wage will likely increase the gain
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to marriage.
This model examines the motivations of an individual woman who
It can be assumed that a single man's be

is considering marriage.

havior is modelled identically .

His optimal lifetime utility attain

able within marriage is compared to his optimal utility as a single
person.

Marriage is optimal to him if the gain from marriage

* - U*5 ) is positive.
(UM

Marriage actually occurs when the gain for

both prospective spouses is positive.

2.

THE AGE AT MARRIAGE

From the model derived in the previous section, an individual
marries at some point in his life if the optimal utility attainable
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from marriage exceeds the optimal utility attainabl e from remaining
Suppose,

single •.

that the utility function consists of a non-stoch astic component

* and some stochasti c component (e) which measures individua l
(U)
tastes, for example:
(3a)

(3b)

Then the probabili ty of ever-marr ying (PEM) during the lifetime is
positivel y related to the gain·from marriage.
(4)

As the gains from marriage increase, the probabili ty of ever-marr ying
and, therefore , the fraction of the lifetime married increases . The
fraction of the lifetime married represent s the probabili ty of ever
marrying:
(5)

PEl-1 =

T - A
T

Rearrangi ng, age at marriage is shown as a decreasin g function of PEM:
(6)

Conseque ntly, those variables that increase the gain from marriage and
the probabili ty of ever-marr ying will systemat ically decrease the age
at marriage.
This modelling requires several comments and caveats.

First, we
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are abstracting from intertemporal variation in utility for both
married and single households.

The gain from production in a married

household obviously changes with the value of time over the life-cycle.
Second, this model allows no marital dissolution.

While inappropriate

for the U.S., this assumption appears reasonable given information for
all Japan and our sample.

In both our sample and all Japan, fewer

than three percent of all women over

3.

thirty had ever divorced.

2

THE SETTING IN JAPAN

Japan provides a very interesting setting for a study of the age
at marriage,

In 1947, with the American Occupation, the Civil Code was

revised to assure women equal property rights, freedom of marriage, and
equal grounds for divorce.

3

At the same time the Labor Standards Law

guaranteed equal pay for equal work.
were enforced is suspect.

The extent to which these rights

In 1965, a government survey of firms in

dicated that 9.4 percent had formal rules requiring retirement of women
upon their marriage. with 7.5 percent of the firms admitting informal
practice of compulsory retirement.

In 27.9 percent of the surveyed

firms, female employees were subject to different retirement age rules
than male employees.

In 1966, the District Court of Tokyo ruled that

the compulsory retirement practiced by a Japanese cement company
violated the provisions of the Civil Code.

2

4

This ruling reenforced the

Japan. Prime Ministers Office. Japan Statistical Yearbook (1975),
and survey data.
3

4

Lebra et al. (1976, p. 20).
Cole (1971) p. 147.

-9freedom to marry, allowing greater flexibility in the age at marriage to
women marrying after 1966.

The practice of compulsory retirement from the paid sector upon
marriage can have differential effects on three groups of women.

In the

absence of this practice, these affected groups are:
(1)

(2) sinple women who are not working, and (3) single

married women,

women who are paid labor force participants.
If there _is no option of divorce, this practice is pro-natalist
for the first group of women.

Compulsory retirement from the paid labor

force essentially rations hours of work in the paid sector.

This practice

reduces the "ration" of market time and increases the "ration" of time in
other activities.

This ration can be viewed symmetrically as a reduction

in the wage married women can receive in the paid labor force.

If discrimina
As a

tion is completely effective, this wage is literally driven to zero.

result, the real value of time foregone in the market in order to raise
children declines and the desired number of children increases,
The second group of women affected by this practice are single women
who are not working.

In this ca 6 e, the value of their time in the home

exceeds the market wage before the practice is established so that the most
efficient use of their time is in home production.

Upon marriage, the

behavior of these women is the same (with or without the law) as long as
the marginal product of their labor after marriage does not fall below their
premarriage war,e.

The same result is expected for women who would withdraw

from the labor force upon marriage in the absence of this practice.

In this

case, marginal product in the home increases with marriage to a point above

-10th~ market wage; the optimal allocation of their time includes no time in
paid employment.
The third group of affected women consists of working sinr,le women
would marry in the absence of compulsory retirement.
choices.

who

These women have two

If they remain single, they can earn a market wage equal to the

value of their time in the home by allocating time both to the market
and to home production.

If they marry, their actual market wage falls to

zero which is less than their market wage if they did not marry.

If all

gains from marriage remain constant, this practice reduces the net benefit of
marriage.women choose to delay marriage beyond the age which is optimal
without compulsory retirement.

The effect on this group of women is anti

natalist since their period of potential childbearing is shortened,
Compulsory retirement upon marriage imposes a welfare loss on women
in groups one and three.

In the absence of the practice, time is ef-

ficiently allocated between home production and the paid labor force until
the marginal product of time in the home is equal to the market wage.
market time is rationed so that the number of hours

If

spent in the paid

labor force is less than the number of unrationed hours, the marginal
product of home time falls below the going market wage.

This wedge

driven between the wage and the value of home time results in a welfare
loss to married women.

For single working women contemplatinr marriage,

this welfare loss is an additional cost of marriap,e and, consequently,
reduces the net benefit to marriage.
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We may express the effect of this mirket discrimination on age at
marriage by first considering a result derived in Tobin and Houthakker
(1958).

5

They show that the effect of an exogenous change in the

quantity of the rationed commodity is equivalent to a compensated change
in the wage:
n

(7)

C

H,WW dWW

where tHR is the rationed time in the formal sector, nc

H,WW

is the compen-

sated own substitution effect, and dWW is the change in the wage.
The effect of this ration on age at marriage then is

(8)

=

comp n H,WW

comp

where 'iJA/aWwl

1
C

comp is simply the compensated substitution effect of the

wage on age at marriage.

Unfortunately, we do not have information on

the cha~ge in the ration of market time that resulted from the court
ruling.

We do know whether a marriage took place before or after the

court ruling; so we const~Jct

these women married after 1966 and equals zero for women married during
or before 1966.

(9)

We consider the effect of Don age at marriage:

"' aA
aww
.

I
comp

5their result generalizes readily when full income (I) is the ap
propriate income measure.
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Given the sign of the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable D
in our age at marriage equation, we may then sign the compensated
effect of a change in the wage on age at marriage.
is positive.

theory that

We know from demand

Also, the effect of the dummy variable

R

on rationed market hours (3tw H/3D) is positive.

Since both terms are

'

positive, the sign of 3A/awj comp will be the sign of the coefficient in
the dummy variable; e.g., if 3A/oD is negative, that will indicate that
· the compensated effect of the wage on age at marriage is also negative.

4.

DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA AND VARIABLES

The data set employed in this analysis draws from a 1975 survey of
women 20 to 59 in the Tok)'Ometro politan area.

This survey includes in

formation on family background and marital status as well as retrospecti ve

6
data on work experience and fertility. ·
Our modelling suggests a regression analysis in which the age at
first marriage depends on the wages of the husband and the wife, their non
wage

income, and the ration

of labor market time.

The sample means and

definitions of the variables used in our estimation are presented in
Table 1.

The mean age at marriage for this sample is 24 with a standard

deviation of 3 years.

Since we had no wage data for non-working womeu,

we predicted their value of time by setting the wage equal to an instru
mental variables prediction of the market wage if they were working in
the paid labor force and equal to their predicted reservation wage if
they were not working in the paid labor force.
6

For a complete description of these data, see Hill (1979).
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TABLE 1
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Used in E!npirical Woiik
(standard deviations in parentheses)
23.8
(3.06)

Age of Marriage
ln Wife's Hourly Wage
(yen per hour)

1

5.70
(0.21)

Wife's Schooling
(years)

11.24
(2.27)

ln Husband's Income

14.27
(0 .21)

(yen per year)
Husband's Schooling
(dummy variable - 1 if mother
completed junior high school)

o. 72

ln Father's Income
(yen per year)

14.67
(0. 24)

Year of Marriage

1961

Married after 1966
(yes = 1)

.35

1

0.31

The 1975 exchange rate was 293.8 yen per dollar,
hence the geometric mean wage is $1.20/hour.

-14While the husband's income was reported, his hours of work were not,
so we have no wage measure for him.

Also, income is reported for the

husband only if he is the primary earner.

We, therefore, use an instru

mental measure of his income which unfortunately incorporates both wage
and labor supply information.

The mother's schooling and the father's

predicted income proxy the woman's own non-wage income and transferred
endowment of wealth and human capital.
are presented in Appendix B.

The wage and income predictions

Any wage measure which is a function of the

wife's age is predicted where the wife's age equals zero when included as
7
a regressor.
The year of marriage captures the secular trend in the age at first
marriage of Japanese women.

The mean year for the sample is 1961.

A

dummy variable equal to one if the woman married after 1966 is included
to measure the response in age at marriage to the 1966 elimi.nation of com

pulsory retirement from paid employment upon marriage.

The regression

sample was limited to those women who are currently married. 8
Schooling of the husband and wife are included in regressions with
and without estimates of the wage or market earnings.

In many studies,

schooling is used as a proxy for the value of time whenever information
on wages is unavailable.

However, education is closely associated with

wealth accumulation, tastes, and efficiency in home production.

Inter

pretation of the coefficient on schooling only as a wage effect requi't"es
restrictive assumptions concerning its other effects.

7

See Davanzo,

~

al., (1976).

8 Estimates excluding
women married before the end of World War II
resulted in little change in the values of the estimated coefficients and
an overall decline in statistical significance.
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TABLE 2
Empirical Results for Age at Marriage
1
(1110 observations)
Independent Variable

(1)

(2)

Intercept

-186.0621
(-6.35)

-160.0812
(-5.68)

ln Wife's Hourly Wage

0 .9131
(3.64)

0.7866
(1.37)

Wife's Schooling

(3)
-181.9962
(-6.11)

-169.50
(-5.94)

0.0807

0.0961
(2.01)

(1.65)

ln Husband's Income

0.5892
(0.94)

Husband's Schooling

-0.9384
(-3.6~)

Mother's Schooling

0.3144
{1.49)

1 n Father's Income
Year of Marriage

-.5202
(-0.90)

(4)

0~8443
(1.47)
-0.9985
(-3. 79)

-0.8052
(-3.53)

o.2854
{1.34)

0.2945
{1.38)

0.3342
{1.58)

0.8218
{2.10)

0.8275
{2.10)

0.8092
{2.06)

0.8769
(2.25)

0.0944
· (6.65)

0.0891
{6.28)

0.0928
{6 .4 7)

0.0919
(6.41)

Married After 1966

-o .9825
{-3.52)

-1.0522
(-3.75)

-0.9873
{-3.53)

-1.0307
(-3. 71)

F-s ta tis tic

10.65

10.11

10.64

12.04

1

t-statistics in parentheses.
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Table 2 presents the empirical results of OLS regressions for age
at marriage for four specifications of the model.

The wife's and the
First,

husband's schooling alternate as measures of the value of time.

the effect of a change in the wife's value of time, measured as her wage
or schooling on age at marriage is positive and significant -- the elasti
cities evaluated at the mean are approximately .04 in each regression.
This result implies that the income elasticities for N and Z outweigh
the elasticity of substitution between N and Z.
Second, when the husband's schooling is included as a regressor,
his income increases the age at marriage, though insignificantly .

When

his level of schooling is not held constant, his income reduces the age
at marriage.

This variable is not a predicted wage or value of time but pre

dicted earnings and, therefore, includes an endogenous labor supply effect which
cannot be separated from the wage effect.

Although the husband's level

of schooling incorporates these same effects, the effect of a change
in his schooling on age at marriage is negative and significant.
elasticity evaluated at

~ho mo~n i~

-.02.

The

The huaband's schooling variable

probably captures an efficiency effect as well as the negative·wealth
effect.

An increase in his level of schooling, will raise his efficiency

in household production and unambiguously increase the gains to marriage.
Third, the proxies for the wife's transferred endowment

father's

income and mother's schooling -- are positive and significant determinants
of the age of marriage; the elasticity of ag~ with respect to mother's
schooling and the elasticity of age with respect to father's income,
evaluated at the sample means, are .005 and .035 respectively.

These

results are as predicted by the model,indicatin g that the share of un
earned income in full single income is greater than the share of unearned
income in full marital income.
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Fourth, the year of marriage is a positive determinant of the age
of marriage.

The trend in age at marriage from 1947 to 1975 is signifi

cantly upwards if we control for individual variation in wages and wealth.
Finally, the court decision in 1966 forbidding discrimination in the
employment of married women has a decidedly negative effect on age at
marriage as expected.

This result indicates that the practice of compulsory

retirement reduced the overall welfare of married women in Japan.

Recall

that this coefficient is a function of the compensated wage effect on age
at marriage, the compensated wage effect on hours, and the effect of the

dummy variable on rationed hours.

Since our estimated coefficient for

3A/3D is negative, the compensated wage effect must be negative.

This result

indicates that the effect of non-wage income on age must be positive, since
our uncompensated wage effect (the sum of the com,pensated effect and the
income effect) is positive.

Overall, the estimated effect of the dummy

variable confirms the predictions of the model.
The regression sample used in estimating the age at marriage equa
tions includes only those women who are currently married.
do not know the age of marriage for never-married women.

We obviously
The young

women (20 to 30) who are currently married are not a random sample of
their cohort.

They have a higher probability of ever marrying than

their counterpartsJ their inclusion in the sample may lead to selectivity
bias in our results.

Rather than exclude these women from the regression

sample, we choose to test for selectivity bias by including the Mill's ratio
correction in the estimated model. 9
Inclusion of this correction for selectivity bias results in a slight

9

The correction was derived from a Logit estimation of the probability
of ever-marrying. Details of the procedure are given in Hay (1979).
Tables of the probability function and the corrected marriage regression
are available upon request.

-18decrease in overall significance of the estimates (e.g., the F-statistic
for the first specification in Table 2 drops from 10.65 to 9.35).

The

coefficient for the selection variable is itself insignificant, and the
remaining coefficients change very little.

Since there is virtually no

evidence of selectivity bias, we choose to present the most significant
empirical results -- those uncorrected for this bias.
7.

CONCLUSIONS

We have derived a model of the decision to marry based on Becker's
model of marriage.

If the utility expected from marriage exceeds the

utility from remaining single, the individual decides to marry at some
point in his lifetime.

This decision to marry is related to the probabili

ty of ever-marrying if the deterministic model is expanded to include
stochastic variation in utility across individuals.

In this case, the

age at marriage becomes a negative function of the probability of ever
marrying.
Few unambiguous predictions

are possible from this model without

assumptions about behavior before and after marriage.
expect

In general, we

the wife's age at marriage to be a positive function of her

wage and wealth and a negative function of her husband's wage and wealth.

The predictions are

supported empirically using Japanese data.

In addition to testing the acme production model, we are

interested

in determining the effect of legal sexual discrimination in the labor mar
ket on the age at marriage.

Applying rationing theory to explain the

direction of effect of market discrimination on age at marriage, we predict

that age at marriage

removed.

This prediction is

declines

if the legal constraint

is

supported by the data after adjusting for

-19-

a positive secular trend in age at marriage in Japan.

Further research

from different cultural settings such as the United States is needed to
support the hypothesis that market discrimination against married women
is a deterrent to marriage.

Economic Growth r,enter, Yale University
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APPENDIX A
The utility function for the married household is an additive

function of the utility of the wife within marriage and the utility
of the husband within marriage.

Marriage occurs whenever the dif

ference between the wife's optimal utility when married and her op
timal utility when single and the difference between the husband's
optimal utility when married and his optimal utility when single
are positive.
In a single woman's household, Zand N are produced with inputs
of her time (~, Z and ~'N) and goo.ds (X~ and

Xi).

In the married

hous_ehold, Z and N are produced with inputs of the husband's time
(tH,Z and tH,N), the wife's time (~,z and ~,N) and goods (~ and
~).

The production functions are assumed to be linear homogeneous.

The shadow prices of Zand N are easily derived as functions of the
input prices--the value of the wife's time (WW), the value of the
husband's time (WH), and the prices of goods in production (PX
PX)

--w

and are presented below.
M

s
z = a tN~Z EWW + ax z

(A.l)

Ens

(A.2)

M
En
2

(A.3)

Ens ==

(A.4)

EJI:: =

z

M
= a tH,Z EWH + aMtW, Z EWW + ax
z

N

N

EPX

EW + a~ EP~

w

M

t

H'·

z

s

s

a~,N

0

EPX

N EWH

M

+ a~,N EWW + a~

EP~

and

z
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where:
, the cost share of K = W or H
in the production of commodity
i = Z,N. IT~. i is the total
cost of production r = S~ ~.

s
Full income in the single household (I) and the married household
(IM) is the smn of unearned income and full wage income and is spent on
time and market goods used in the production of Zand N.

The time cost

and the value of purchased goods form the shadow prices of Zand N (rr 2
and IlN).

The full income constraint is given in (A.5):

(A.Sa)

(A.Sb)

The first order differentiation of the utility function in percentage
change terms is:

(A.6)

EU=

To compare the maximmn utility attainable in the married household with
the maximum utility for the single household, we must evaluate (A.6) at
the optimal values of Zs, NS and ZM, ~is:

Then the gain from marriage
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Where

eM =

L

and

t.f1_us

es = -ust/1-us ,

b oth assume d to b e pos i tive.
.

These

optimal demands may in turn be expressed as functions of full income
(Is and Im), and the shadow prices of their production

(n!,

IT~,

The form of these demands is independent of the marital state.

rr;, ~).
If r

indexes the marital state and equals Sor M, then the optimal demands
in percentage chages are:

The factor shares and elasticities in equations (A.8) and (A.9) are
defined as:
o = the elasticity of substitution between Z

and Nin consumption.
Ei
n = EI, the full income ~lasticity of demand
1
for i = Z,N.

n1r • i
I

----- U.1.
.:,~ ..........
I. y
, the budget share of 1.:UlllJ.IIU

r
in fuli income I , r = S,µ.
r
The final expression for the gains from marriage may be derived by substituting (A.l) - (A.5) into (A.7).

(A.10)

The final equation is:
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where the a's and o's are defined as follows:

a

a

2

3

==

M

e [nz Yv J
H

=

a4 =

nz (e

M M

Yv,

w

_

8

sys )
Vw

sI s
(K~
- 8 nNYw + -N ~
W

+ Ksz

O

) at.._
s N . Ks (
) s J
- z o-nN at z
w,
N,
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where:
the share of full earnings of K = W,H in full
income I

r

Yy

r

where r = S,M.T is the endowment of time.

the share of the non-earnings wealth of K

=

= W,H in

K

full income I , r = S,M.
r
In drawing implications from our model, we assume:
The budget share of N is greater in married
households.
The budget share of Z is greater in single
households.
M
Yw < Yws
w
w

The share of the wife's earnings in full income
is lower in married than in single households.

S
N > at N
W,
W,

M

at

The time share of the wife in producing N
is higher in married households.

M
at-

""W,

Z

S
< a

~,

Z

The time share of the wife in producing Z
is higher in single households.
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APPENDIX B
L

ESTIMATING WAGE AND INCOME VARIABLES

As discussed in the text, estimatio n of the marriage model requires
1
measures of the value of the wife s time, the value of the husband's

time and the female's transferr ed endowment as proxied by her father's
income.

The procedure for measuring the lifetime value of the female's

time takes into considera tion the censoring error of predictin g a wage
1 Since income infor all women based only on the working sub-sampl e.
formation was reported for the husband and the father only if they were
the primary income earner, we use instrumen tal variables predictio ns
for these two income measures.

Each predictin g equation is discussed

in tum.
2. WIFE'S WAGE

The measured market wage may understat e the true value of time for
Hence the predicted value of the female's time is

non-worki ng women.

set equal to an instrumen tal value of the market wage if they are working in the paid labor force and to their predicted reservati on wage if

they are not working in the paid labor force.

This procedure is based

The lifetime offered wage W0 is a function

on work by Cogan (1975).

of each woman's level of schooling and her labor market experienc e:
(B. l)

W = f
0

0

(schoolin g, experienc e).

Following Mincer (1963), we define the experienc e variables as:

(B. 2)

Experien ce= Age - Schooling -6.

1we do not correct for selectivi ty bias since there was little
evidence of this bias in early work with these data. (See Hill (1979).)
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The reservation wage is defined as:

W = f

(B.3)

R

(schooling, husband's income, family
R business, home ownership).

The choice to participate in the paid labor force in the current period
relies on a comparison of the reservation wage with the offered wage.
In order to estimate the parameters of the participation and wage frmctions,
we must first specify functional forms and stochastic structure:

(B.4)lnW 0 = S01 + So2 Schooling+
(B.5)lnWR

$

03

Experience+ E~

= SRl + SR 2 Schooling+ SRJ husband's income+ SR4 family
business+ SRS home ownership+ ER

where E and ER are independent and identically distributed Weibull
0

errors.

The probability of labor force participation (Pi) is then:
1

(B.6)

X
1 + e -(S o o

-

SRX_)
~~

The parameters of the participation function may now be estimated with
a logit technique since ER - E0 has a logistic distribution (McFadden
(1975)).

Given the parameters of the market wage, estimated by OLS,

·we may then identify the reservation wage function.
are presented in Table B.l.

These estimates
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TABLE B.l

ESTIMATED EQUATIONS FOR PREDICTING THE VALUE OF TIME
(t-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES)

Independent
Variable

1

Means

Labor Force
Participation

13.5054
(2.20)

Intercept

Market
Wage

4,7038
(19.16)

Years of Schooling

10. 72

.01105
(.75)

.08528
(4.90)

Experience

19.60

.03092
(4.03)

.003835
(1.05)

Home Ownership

1n Husband 1 s Predicted
Income

.08250

-.7538
(-4.39)

.09091

0.22

-.7562
(-3,74)

.1291

14.56

-1.05
(-2.47)

,1247

2

X5

-log likelihood
F-statistic

1

2,9168

0.60

Dummy
Family Business
Dummy

Reservation
Wage

t-statistics are asymptotic

64.37

474.53
13.60
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3. HUSBAND'S INCOME
The predicting equation for the husband's income is based on a
linear model in which the dependent variable, the natural logarithm of
annual earnings, is regressed on three durmny variables indicating the
highest level of schooling which the husband completed, and
variables describing the husband's occupation.

a set of dummy

Since the husband's

age is not reported, the wife's age serves as a proxy.

A dmmny variable,

equal to one if the husband has ever been unemployed represents disrup
tion in work experience.

Table B.2 presents the results.
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TABLE B.2

ESTIMATES FOR PREDICTING THE HUSBAND'S INCOME
(918 OBSERVATIONS)

Independent Variables

Means

Intercept

Coefficient

t-statistic

13. 9613

232.26

Ever unemployed (yes=l)

0.06

-0.1494

-2.91

High School

0.38

0.1558

4.88

Technical School or
Junior College

0.11

0.2006

4.31

College

0.24

0.3291

7.76

37.23

0.007744

5.59

Self-employed

0.19

.3033

8.46

Professional

0.09

.1238

2.38

Manager

0.07

.4282

7.75

Salary man, large firm

0.16

.2125

5.09

Salary man, small £inn

0.11

.1371

3.06

Blue Collar, large firm

0.09

.07063

li51

Wife's Age

Occupational Variables

F

29.34
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4•

FATIIER' S INCOME

The father's income is reported only for those women whose fathers

are the primary income earner.

Table B.3 presents the predicting equa

tion based on the available sample information.
is similar to that for the husband.

The model for the father

A variable equal to one if the father

completed college represents the father's schooling.
seven occupational categories are also included.

Dummy variables for
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TABLE B.3

ESTIMATES FOR PREDICTING THE FAIBER'S INCOME

Independent Variable

Means

Intercept

Coefficient

t

14.9156

75.24

College

0.17

.1768

1.01

Farmer

0.14

-.5442

-2.25

Self-employed

0.24

-.09706

-0.45

Manager

0.07

-.1705

-0.63

Salary man, large firm

0.14

-.3225

-1.42

Salary man, small firm

0.07

-.1919

-0.69

Blue Collar, large firm

0.11

-.3936

..-1.57

Blue Collar, small firm

0.15

-.6054

-2.55

F

2.66
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